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Studying Farm Insurance Demand  
under Financial Constraints 
 
Lajos Baráth - Raushan Bokusheva - Imre Fertő 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We hypothesize a reciprocal causation between crop insurance use and the economic 
performance of farms in an environment characterized by imperfect financial markets and 
farms’ budget constraints. To test our hypothesis, we apply a system of simultaneous 
equations consisting of economic performance and insurance demand models to the case 
study of Hungarian cropping farms. In addition, considering that insured farms may have 
better access to external finance, we seek empirical evidence confirming a potential positive 
effect of crop insurance on the economic performance of financially constrained farms. Our 
study results indeed confirm the reciprocal causation hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: crop insurance demand; farm productivity; financial constraints; farm 
investment; Hungarian agriculture. 
 
JEL: G22, L25, Q12, Q14. 
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Mezőgazdasági üzemek biztosítási keresletének 
vizsgálata pénzügyi korlát esetén 
 
Baráth Lajos - Raushan Bokusheva - Fertő Imre 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A cikkben reciprok kapcsolatot feltételezünk a biztosítás és a gazdaságok üzemi teljesítménye 
között egy olyan környezetben, amelyben a pénzügyi piacok működése nem tökéletes és 
jellemzőek a pénzügyi korlátok. A hipotézis teszteléséhez olyan szimultán egyenletrendszert 
használunk, amely a gazdasági teljesítmény és biztosítási kereslet közötti kapcsolatot 
modellezi a magyar növénytermesztő üzemek esetében. Mivel a biztosítással rendelkező 
üzemek könnyebben hozzáférhetnek külső finanszírozási formákhoz, az ebből adódó 
potenciális hatást is vizsgáljuk. Az eredmények egyértelműen alátámasztották a biztosítás és a 
gazdasági teljesítmény közötti reciprok kapcsolat meglétét.  
 
Tárgyszavak: biztosítási kereslet; termelékenység, TFP, pénzügyi korlát, magyar 
mezőgazdaság, beruházás. 
 
JEL: G22, L25, Q12, Q14 
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Agricultural production is affected by many sources of risk, including natural disasters.  
To ensure a stable economic performance, risks have to be efficiently managed. For extreme 
weather events such as flooding, hail or drought, on-farm risk management measures may be 
too costly and only partially effective. These risks in general could be much more effectively 
managed by financial risk management instruments such as crop insurance (Skees, 1999; 
Meuwissen, 2001).  
Two aspects explain the farmer’s use of crop insurance. The first one concerns the 
behaviour of the risk-averse decision maker. According to the Expected Utility (EU) model, 
the risk-averse decision maker is anticipated to be willing to pay the risk premium which is 
equal to the difference between her expected income and certainty equivalent. Therefore, in 
the case of crop insurance, the farmer pays to the insurer an insurance premium consisting of 
two parts – fair premium and risk premium. The second aspect considers positive 
externalities related to the stabilizing effect of crop insurance on the farm income (Hazell, 
1985). This aspect might be especially relevant in the context of financial market 
imperfections such as credit rationing. In credit-rationed agricultural environments, as often 
found in developing and transition countries, farms with more stable incomes may obtain 
better access to credits and thus invest in more productive technologies. As the boost in 
production technology should lead to a significant increase in productivity, crop insurance 
use might indirectly lead to an increase in farm economic performance in the long term.  
The first aspect of the farmer’s use of crop insurance is present mostly under all 
circumstances. In this case, crop insurance premium reduces the risk-averse farmer’s profit. 
The manifestation of the second aspect, however, is subject to a variety of factors related to 
both insurance product peculiarities and contract characteristics, and farm production and 
management specifics. Depending on the extent of both effects, the overall impact of crop 
insurance use on farms’ long-term economic performance might be positive or negative. This 
study aims to conduct an empirical evaluation of the impact of crop insurance on the 
economic performance of farms. While several studies have investigated the demand for crop 
insurance, to the best of our knowledge, no study has evaluated the effect of crop insurance 
use on farm economic performance. 
Empirical studies that assess determinants of economic performance (e.g., Purdi et al., 
1997; El-Osta, 1998; Mishra et al., 1999; Gloy et al., 2002; Rizov and Mathijs, 2003; Gorton 
and Davidova, 2004; El-Osta et al., 2007) use various methods such as Jovanovic’s model of 
firm growth (Jovanovic, 1982) or a system of equations including a separate equation to 
appropriately model the effect of risk  (Purdi et al., 1997). These studies identify factors (e.g., 
farm and farmer characteristics, production structures) which contribute to a farm’s 
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economic success. Studies on insurance demand mostly focus on discrete insurance choice 
models (Coble et al., 1996; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Enjolras 
and Sentis, 2008) and truncated models determining willingness to pay or coverage-level 
decision (Smith and Baquet, 1996; van Asseldonk et al., 2002; Adhikari et al., 2010). Most of 
the above-cited studies analyze farm insurance demand in the context of developed countries, 
where insurance demand is not necessarily affected by farmers’ budget constraints. 
Regarding transition countries, however, farmers’ budget constraints might seriously deter 
the use of crop insurance (Bielza Diaz-Caneja et al., 2008). Under these circumstances, the 
farm’s financial performance becomes an important determinant for the farmer’s decision to 
purchase insurance. When formulating an insurance demand model, the neglect of this fact 
might cause endogeneity problems. Therefore, in our analysis we suggest using a 
simultaneous equation model which allows controlling for a reciprocal causation between 
farm insurance demand and economic performance.  
This paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the methodology applied to 
cope with the problem of potential reciprocal causation between farms’ economic 
performance and insurance demand. Because insurance demand is measured as the 
insurance premium paid, our estimation procedure has to involve a tobit model specification. 
Ordinary simultaneous least squares procedures would fail to provide consistent estimates 
under these conditions (Maddala, 1983). The third section discusses the empirical 
background of the study and presents the data. The empirical procedures employed are 
described in the fourth section. The specifications of the reciprocal causation model applied 
in the study are given in the fifth section. The sixth section presents and discusses estimation 
results. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In our study we employ a system of simultaneous equations formulated as follows 
(Amemiya,1979; Maddala, 1983):1 
 
 
 
where  is the index of the farmer, and  denotes the index of explanatory 
variables. The indices  and  will be dropped from now on for better legibility.  
                                                        
1The model notation is consistent with that used by Amemiya (1979) and Maddala (1983). 
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Equation (1) corresponds with the economic performance model. Accordingly, the 
dependent variable  indicates the economic performance indicator and is observed, thus, 
.  
Equation (2) describes the crop insurance demand model. In this equation, the 
dependent variable is a latent variable indicating the farmer’s willingness to pay for crop 
insurance; accordingly, only positive values can be observed:  if ; otherwise, 
.  
The vectors of explanatory variables in (1) and (2) are denoted by  and , respectively. 
The variables  and  are the error terms of (1) and (2). 
Coefficients , , and  are parameters to be estimated. Coefficients  and  are 
expected to be non-zero and to obtain statistically significant estimates, which would confirm 
the hypothesis of reciprocal causation.  
The model estimation algorithm follows the two-stage approach proposed by Nelson and 
Olson (1978), Amemiya (1979) and Maddala (1983). In the first stage, a reduced form model 
is estimated. The reduced form of the model (Maddala, 1983, model 2, p. 243) is  
 
 
 
where X consists of distinct column vectors in  and ,  and  are the coefficients, and 
 and  are the error terms of the reduced model. The coefficients of the equation with the 
continuous dependent variable (equation 3) are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS); 
those of equation (4) with the truncated dependent variable specification by the tobit method 
(Amemiya, 1979; Maddala, 1983). 
In the second stage, the predicted values  and  from the first stage are 
used to estimate the following structural equations: 
 
  
Again, equation (5) is estimated by OLS, and equation (6) by the tobit model. This 
procedure leads to efficient estimates for coefficients , , and . However, the standard 
errors of the second stage estimation are biased due to the use of estimated values for  and 
 Therefore, the correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is obtained according to the 
error correction procedure as formulated by Amemiya (1979). 
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3. Empirical Background and Data  
 
The empirical analysis is done by employing the Hungarian crop farm data which were 
available from the national farm accountancy data network (FADN). According to the FADN, 
only about 40% of all Hungarian farmers who specialized in crop production used crop 
insurance products in the period from 2004 to 2009. 
According to a survey conducted recently by the Hungarian Research Institute of 
Agricultural Economics (Kemény et al., 2011), the main reason for crop insurance purchase is 
risk management (as indicated by about 50% of the interviewed farmers). Roughly 20% of 
the interviewees answered that they purchase crop insurance mainly because it is demanded 
by an integrator. Furthermore, over 40% of the surveyed farmers responded that they do not 
have enough financial means to acquire crop insurance. The latter survey outcome is 
consistent with the findings by Bielza Diaz-Caneja et al. (2008) that the income situation of 
most Hungarian farmers does not allow them to cover the insurance cost, and that insurance 
products are mostly purchased because it is a requirement for getting loans. 
The demand for crop insurance in Hungary might have been additionally limited because 
crop insurance available during the study period, i.e., from 2004 to 2009, did not provide 
coverage against the most important risks, such as drought or spring frost. However, since 
2007 the Hungarian government has provided an alternative instrument for farm income 
stabilization, the so-called Damage Mitigation System (DMS), which covers such risks as 
drought and spring frost (Kemény, 2011). The DMS premium is financed 50% by 
participating farmers and 50% by the Hungarian government. In 2009, the DMS became 
mandatory for small- and medium-sized farms. 
Additionally, a new insurance system – the New Risk Management Act (NRMA) – which 
aims to include all important risks, was launched in 2012. Under this NRMA, crop insurance 
and the DMS are combined to provide coverage against all important risks in Hungarian 
agriculture. In the NRMA framework, insurance premiums are expected to be subsidized up 
to 65% (Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture 2013). However, as the data for 2012 were not 
available, that year is not included in our analysis. 
In our study we analyze the data for the period from 2004 to 2009. Although the FADN 
data were available for earlier periods, we intentionally exclude them from the analysis to 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
focus on the period without any direct governmental support for crop insurance in Hungary2 
(Bielza Diaz-Caneja, 2008).  
The analysis is conducted only for farms that specialized in crop production, as defined in 
the EU FADN (EU 2007). After deletion of observations with missing values, the total 
number of entries is reduced from 6571 to 4693.3  
Table 1 presents the list of all variables considered in the analysis. Their descriptions 
correspond with the definitions of variables used in the EU FADN (EU 2007) and the 
Hungarian farm return form for farm reporting (AKI 2009a). Monetary indicators are given 
in 1000 Hungarian Forints (HUF), and are deflated to the year 2005 by using price indices as 
provided by the Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Specifically, we use the 
agricultural output index to deflate the farm’s total output. Variable inputs for crop 
production, total fixed assets and investments are deflated by employing the price index for 
purchased goods and services.  
The crop insurance use is measured as the insurance premium paid per hectare of the 
farm’s total agricultural land. Farm performance is characterized by two alternative measures 
– farm profit margin (PM) and total factor productivity (TFP) levels. The PM is defined as the 
ratio of the profit to the total output of a farm, and thus it is a measure of profitability. In our 
analysis, we define profit as the difference between total output and total input (Table 1). The 
derivation of TFP scores requires more explanations and will be described further in the text.   
For purposes of the TFP estimation, the farm output variable is measured by the sum of 
sales and the value of agricultural products consumed at the farm. Land is defined as the 
farm’s total agricultural area. Labour is measured as the number of annual work units, the 
capital variable is represented by the value of the farm’s total fixed assets, and the materials 
variable is defined as total specific costs.  
Other indicators used in the study are costs of irrigation, seeds, fertilizer and crop 
protection, and share of rented land. The extent of farm diversification is determined as the 
inverse of the Herfindahl index (Rhoades 1993), i.e., the inverse of the sum of squared shares 
of outputs of different crops.  
 
                                                        
2The practice of governmental subsidization of crop insurance premium was abolished in 2004. 
Accordingly, during the analyzed period (2004-2009), the Hungarian crop insurance market was 
functioning without substantial disturbances from the side of the government. 
3Since corporate farms only voluntarily reported the educational levels of farm managers before 
2009, missing values are filled up according to the data for 2009 and 2010 if the farms had been in 
the sample in earlier years (i.e., we assume that no major personnel changes in the farm 
management took place during those two years).  
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Table 1. 
Summary statisticsa 
Variable Description Mean  St. Dev. 
Total input  Total production costs  22430.13  46122.36  
Total output  Sales and farm internal use of agricultural products 19233.93  27870.36  
Crop insurance  Insurance intensity: crop insurance premium paid 
per ha 
0.65  2.46  
Labour  Annual work units, full-time person equivalent  2.16  4.12  
Land  Total utilized agricultural area  145.24  225.53  
Materials Total variable cost of production 7874.01 15403.54 
Fixed assets  Value of farm fixed assets 44298.83  58046.74  
Subsidies  Total subsidies, excluding subsidies on investments 7610.35  15912.03  
Irrigation  Share of irrigated land 0.02  0.10  
Seeds  Cost of seeds per 1 ha of land 16.85  29.60  
Fertilizer  Cost of fertilizer per 1 ha of land 17.90  13.53  
Crop protection  Cost of crop protection per 1 ha of land 13.07  12.55  
Soil quality  Soil fertility measured in golden crown valueb 20.53  7.10  
Yield of wheat  Yield of wheat and spelt in t/ha 3.56  2.07  
Yield of grain maize  Yield of grain maize in t/ha 5.29  3.59  
Diversification  Inverse of sum of squared shares of output of 
cereals, protein crops, energy crops, potatoes, oil 
crops, sugar beets, industrial crops, vegetables and 
flowers, fruits, forage crops and livestock 
1.91  0.62  
Investment  Investment per 1 ha of land 30.13  94.57  
Investment 
subsidies 
Total subsidies related to farm investment 
678.46  3694.56  
Long- and  
medium-term loans  
Loans obtained for a period of more than one year 
0.71  0.46  
Debts to assets  Total assets / Total liabilities 65.42  527.84  
Rented land  Rented utilized agricultural area/total utilized 
agricultural area 
0.44  0.34  
DMS payments  Payments received from the DMS system 34.46  483.52  
Age  Age of farm manager (years) 49.84  9.54  
Education  Level of (agricultural) competence of farm 
manager: 1=none, 2=vocational studies underway, 
3=skilled worker or technician, 4=farm engineer, 
5=agricultural engineer 
2.90  1.43  
a Monetary values are given in 1000 HUF. The descriptions follow the definitions of variables used in 
the FADN and the Hungarian farm return form  (AKI, 2009a). 
b The average golden crown value indicates soil fertility, on the basis of the ancient currency “gold 
crown” of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Burger 1998). 
Source: FADN data and authors calculations 
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In addition to the continuous variables presented in Table 1, several dummy variables are 
created to control for regional and structural differences among the study farms. We 
distinguish among three different regions to control for agro-climatic differences. The largest 
share of analyzed farms (43.92%) is situated in the Great Plain. Transdanubia is represented 
in the sample by 38.1% of total observations. The remaining subset of farms (18.0%) is 
located in Northern and Central Hungary.  
To account for the dichotomy present in Hungarian agriculture (Rizov, 2003; AKI 2009), 
we introduce a dummy variable for small, private family farms which form 49.6% of all 
sample observations.4  
Furthermore, we distinguish between two periods: The first period consists of the years 
from 2004 to 2007, when there was no DMS, and the second period spans the years from 
2007 to 2009, when the DMS was available. An additional dummy is created for 2009, 
indicating the year where the DMS became compulsory for small- and medium-sized farms.  
 
4. Empirical Procedures 
 
We introduce several adjustments to the data presented in the previous section to make it 
appropriate for the estimation of the simultaneous equation model. In particular, we use 
factor analysis to reveal latent structures in the data and derive the TFP levels, which in 
addition to farm PM, is used to quantify farm performance.  
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
The FADN data contain a large variety of variables (Table 1), each describing a particular 
aspect of the farm organization and management. If all variables are introduced into the 
analysis, multicollinearity problems could occur and cause biased estimates. At the same 
time, if the set of available variables is reduced to their selection, there is a danger of losing 
some valuable information. In our study, we cope with this problem by means of exploratory 
factor analysis. 
The factors are generated using principle component analysis and Varimax rotation 
(Harman, 1976). To obtain a solution that reveals a latent structure within the data, we 
examine different sets of available indicators. Finally, a 10-factor solution is adopted for 
                                                        
4Family farms are determined as farms with a share of unpaid labor (full-time worker equivalent) 
higher than 95% (Hill 1993). 
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further analysis (Table 2). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.79, 
which confirms the adequacy of this solution (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). 
Table 2.  
Factor analysis results  
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Labour 0.88a 
         Land 0.94 
         Fixed assets 0.80 
         Subsidies 0.93 
         Irrigation 
 
0.75
        Seeds 
 
0.80 
        Fertilizer 
 
0.65 
        Crop protection 
 
0.83 
        Soil quality 
  
0.66
       Yield of wheat 
  
0.70 
       Yield of grain maize 
  
0.65 
       Investment 
   
0.83
      Subsidies on investment 0.41
  
0.62 
      Long-, medium-term 
loans 
   
0.32 -0.58 
     Debts to assets 
    
0.88 
     Diversification 
     
0.96
    Age 
      
0.93
   Rented land 
       
0.89
  Education 
        
0.97
 DMS payments 
         
0.96
SS loadingsb 3.50 2.43 1.64 1.32 1.16 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.00 0.98 
Proportion variance 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
a Factor loadings of variables on 10 different factors (only loadings with an absolute value larger than 
0.4 are  reported). 
b Sum of squares of loadings 
Source: authors’ calculations  
 
 
The factors obtained are interpreted as follows: F1=farm size,5 since the first factor is 
mainly determined by variables such as labour, land, fixed assets and subsidies, i.e., variables 
which capture different characteristics of the farm size. The second factor, F2=intensity, is 
formed by the intensity of the different inputs’ use, in particular, irrigation, seeds, fertilizer 
and crop protection. The third factor, F3=production potential, is mainly determined by the 
soil quality and the yields of wheat and maize grain, i.e., it presents the farm’s production 
                                                        
5In the text, factor names are written in italics. 
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potential. The fourth factor, F4=investment, refers to all variables related to investment, such 
as the investment intensity, subsidies on investment, and the long- and medium-term loans. 
The factor F5=indebtedness is primarily determined by the variable “debts to assets ratio” 
and is a bipolar factor, showing that highly indebted farmers are less likely to receive long- 
and medium-term loans. The remaining factors F6-F10 correspond to the single variables 
diversification, age, rented land, education and DMS payments, respectively.  
TFP ESTIMATION 
Out of the large variety of possible economic performance indicators, we use two indicators. 
The first indicator is the profit margin (PM). The second indicator is total factor productivity 
(TFP) level, which presents a more complex measure of farm performance. It expresses farm 
productivity as a ratio of all farm outputs produced to the total amount of inputs used for 
their production. Accordingly, while PM refers to the farm’s financial performance, TFP is 
more strongly related to production and technological aspects.  
The TFP is a comprehensive measure summarizing technical efficiency change, technical 
change and scale efficiency change. Productivity can generally be estimated either by using 
direct index-number techniques based on price data, or by employing nonparametric or 
parametric techniques (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003; Fried et al., 2008). Two latter 
approaches require the estimation of production technology parameters by employing a 
deterministic and nonparametric method called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or a 
parametric method called Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).  
The DEA approach is more flexible as it does not require any assumption about the 
functional form of the frontier and any assumptions concerning the distribution of the 
inefficiency and stochastic noise terms (Fried, 2008). However, it is very sensitive to outliers. 
As stochastic specification of the production frontier permits taking into account random 
shocks that affect production but lie outside the producer’s control, SFA is considered a more 
appropriate approach for an environment characterized by considerable random shocks. 
Considering that our study is done for a transition country, we suppose that random shocks 
might indeed be pronounced in the data; thus, we employ the SFA approach. Additionally, to 
account for unmeasured heterogeneity, we use a Random Parameter Model (RPM) (Greene, 
2005) defined for balanced panel data with  indicating the farmers and  
indicating the time period.  
A random parameter model (Greene, 2004) is generally formulated as follows:  
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with   
 
,  and , 
, 
and 
, 
where  denotes the log of the output,  is the log of the inputs,  represents unmeasured 
heterogeneity,  is the stochastic noise term and  is the inefficiency term.  
We use the translog functional form to specify our empirical model, i.e.: 
 
                 (8) 
       
 
We define the output  as the farm’s total output (see Table 1), and use four inputs 
( ), namely, labor ( ), land ( ), capital ( ) and materials ( ). Additionally, a time 
variable  is added to capture the effect of technological change.  
For purposes of the TFP calculation, we use a transitive multilateral consistent TFP index, 
following the approach proposed by Caves et al. (1982) 6. The TFP index constructed in this 
way allows both multitemporal (i.e., two points in time) and multilateral (i.e.,  two farms at a 
similar point in time) comparisons7. The basic idea of Caves’ approach is to consider 
deviations from the sample means in the construction of the index. Accordingly, in general, 
the translog multilateral productivity index between farm  in period t and the sample 
average can be formulated as follows: 
                                                        
6To calculate this index, we have to reduce our sample to a balanced data set, which results in 4020 
entries. 
7 Further information about the background and empirical usage of this method can be found e.g. in 
Timmer et al. (2010).  
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with  outputs and  inputs;  and  stand for single outputs’ and inputs’ 
shares, respectively. The bar above a variable refers to the arithmetic mean of the variable 
over all sample observations.  
In addition, instead of using inputs’ and outputs’ shares, the TFP index can be 
constructed using the production technology parameter estimates. Two main advantages of 
this approach are: first, the index can be calculated without price data; second, it allows TFP 
change decomposition due to different sources.  
In particular, the TFP index can be decomposed8 into: an effect which results from 
adjustments in the scale of factor use (SEC), technological change effect (TCH) and technical 
efficiency change (TEC), i.e.:  
   
Table 3 presents model parameter estimates (see Appendix). As the input variables are 
normalized by their geometric means, the first order coefficients correspond to the output 
elasticities evaluated at the sample mean. The model parameter estimates show that all 
output elasticities have expected signs and are significantly different from zero. Moreover, 
the estimates of the time variable  imply that a technological regress occurred over the 
analyzed period. The sum of elasticities was 1.06, which suggests slightly increasing returns 
to scale. The estimate of the lambda parameter was 2.4 and was statistically significant, 
indicating that inefficiency is an important phenomenon in Hungarian agriculture; 
consequently, omitting the inefficiency term from the production model would have caused 
biased results.  
Since theoretical conditions–monotonicity and necessary conditions for quasi-concavity–
were fulfilled in the model, we can state that its results are applicable for our empirical 
analysis.  
 
 
                                                        
8For the formal description of this separation, consult Caves (1982). 
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Table 3. 
SFA model parameter estimates 
Non-random parameters  Means for random parameters 
Parameter Coefficient  Parameter Coefficient 
t^2 -0.002   Constant 0.276 *** 
Labour*Land -0.060 ***  t -0.009 *** 
Labour*Capital 0.000   Labour 0.144 *** 
Labour*Materials 0.001   Land 0.387 *** 
Land*Capital -0.048 ***  Capital 0.103 *** 
Land*Materials -0.166 ***  Materials 0.429 *** 
Capital*Materials 0.013      
Labour^2 0.108 ***  Variance and asymmetry parameters  
Land^2 0.231 ***  Sigma 0.441 *** 
Capital^2 0.043 ***  Lambda 2.435 *** 
Materials^2 0.137 ***     
t*Labour 0.001      
t*Land -0.006      
t*Capital 0.000      
t*Materials 0.008      
Source: authors’ calculations  
 
5. Model Specifications 
 
In our empirical analysis, we employ two model specifications, corresponding with two 
economic performance indicators employed. The first specification refers to PM, a simple 
financial measure of farm performance. Similar straightforward measures like net farm 
income or the income of a farm in relation to the income of other farm indicators are used in 
empirical studies by e.g., El-Osta (1998), Mishra (1999), El-Osta et al. (2007) or 
Aggelopoulos et al. (2007). Some studies employ long-term indicators that measure the 
stability of farm performance. For example, Purdi et al. (1997) use both the mean and 
variance of return on equity over 20 years. However, our data set is not sufficiently long to 
obtain reliable estimates of the variance and higher moments of distribution.  
The second model specification uses TFP level as the dependent variable in the economic 
performance model. While most empirical literature employs technical efficiency as an 
indicator of farm productivity (e.g., van Passel, 2006; Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; Hansson 
and Öhlmér, 2008; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2009; Bakucs et al., 2011), only a few studies apply 
TFP to describe farm performance in a modelling approach (e.g., Gardebroek, 2003). 
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However, since the TFP indicator is a more comprehensive measure of farms’ productivity, it 
allows for a more complete assessment of farm performance.  
Besides the two different economic performance indicators, other model parameters (the 
second dependent variable and all the explanatory variables) remain the same for both model 
specifications.  
THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MODEL 
The set of the explanatory variables in the economic performance model consists of the 
factors farm size, intensity, investment, production potential, diversification, rented land, 
age and education, as well as dummy variables for single regions and family farms (the 
region of Central Hungary and non-family farms are used as the reference category), and the 
time variable. With our choice of explanatory variables, we are in line with many recent 
empirical studies conducted to identify determinants of income variation (El-Osta and 
Johnson, 1998; Mishra et al., 1999; El-Osta et al., 2007), farm long-term performance (Purdi 
et al., 1997; Gloy et al., 2002; Rizov and Mathijs, 2003), or farm technical efficiency (van 
Passel et al., 2006; Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; Hansson and Öhlmér, 2008; Bojnec and 
Latruffe, 2009; Bakucs et al., 2010; 2012). 
Size-related variables reveal economies of scale effects and are thus considered by most 
above-cited authors (Purdi et al., 1997; Gloy et al., 2002; Rizov and Mathijs, 2003; van Passel 
et al., 2006; El-Osta et al., 2007).  
The factors indicating the intensity of the production and farm production potential 
(factors 2 and 3, respectively) are expected to obtain a positive coefficient estimate. As 
investment in new, more productive technologies are supposed to improve farm productivity 
and long-term performance, the factor investment is expected to influence both economic 
performance measures positively.  
Diversification refers to economies of scope; its impact might strongly depend on the 
peculiarities of the farm’s external environment. Therefore, it is not surprising that this 
variable’s effect differs from study to study. Purdi et al. (1997) reveal a negative impact of 
diversification on the mean of the economic performance indicator, but a positive impact on 
its variance. However, diversified farms tend to be less efficient in production, according to 
van Passel et al. (2006).  
The effect of the farm manager’s age (factor 7) on farm performance is difficult to predict 
a priori. On one hand, older managers might be more experienced and thus more successful 
in their business. On the other hand, younger managers might exhibit more entrepreneurial 
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abilities than their older counterparts educated during the Socialist time, and thus have 
better prospects to increase farm performance. For example, Bakucs and Fertő (2009) show 
that the age of farmers has a negative impact on farm growth. 
The share of rented land (factor 8) can be regarded as an indicator of farm growth and 
thus might signal farm entrepreneurial and managerial capacities. Accordingly, it is expected 
to have a positive effect on farm economic performance. A similar outcome should be 
triggered by the farm manager´s educational background (factor 9). 
Several recent studies consider in their analyses the share of paid labour input (Gloy et 
al., 2002; Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2009). In our study, we control 
for this aspect through the family farm dummy variable. However, the impact of this variable 
is difficult to predict. Although family farms have a negligible wage cost, economies of scale 
may overweigh this advantage.   
THE INSURANCE DEMAND MODEL 
In both model specifications, the crop insurance demand is measured as the insurance 
premium paid per hectare of farm agricultural land. Explanatory variables are the factors 
size, investment, potential, DMS payments, diversification, rented land, age, education and 
indebtedness, as well as the dummy variables for family farms, the 2007-2009 period and the 
year 2009 (non-family farms and the 2004-2006 period are the reference categories, 
respectively). 
The objectives of previous empirical studies on determinants of insurance demand are: to 
find reasons for a low participation in agricultural insurance programs (van Asseldonk et al., 
2002; Enjolras and Sentis, 2008), to detect moral hazards and adverse selection problems 
(Coble et al., 1996; Smith and Baquet, 1996), and to determine factors that could help 
improve policies and target supportive payments more precisely (Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; 
Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2010). Next to farm accountancy data, 
customized surveys and/or climate data are often included in such analyses (Coble et al., 
1996; van Asseldonk et al., 2002; Sherrick et al., 2004; Morales et al., 2008).  
Determinants of insurance demand employed in recent literature can be categorized into 
groups of variables indicating risk management substitutes, the farmer’s risk perception and 
attitude, farm risk exposure and farm characteristics such as size, economic performance or 
investment.   
In our study, risk management substitutes include diversification and DMS payments. 
The impact of risk management substitutes on crop insurance demand is expected to be 
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negative.  This effect is supposed to be particularly pronounced in the context of a credit-
rationed agriculture. Indeed, we suppose that farmers experiencing budget constraints do not 
have enough means to adopt several risk management measures at the same time.  
Furthermore, we employ the farmer's age and education, as well as farm indebtedness, as 
important determinants of the farmer’s risk perception and attitude. Older and/or better 
educated farmers might perceive risk more adequately and be able to choose a more suitable 
risk management instrument for their farms. Most recent studies have found a positive 
impact of the farmer's education on insurance use (except Enjolras and Sentis, 2008). 
However, regarding the farmer's age, the results are inconsistent across different 
investigations; while Sherrick et al. (2004) reveal a positive impact of the farmer’s age on 
insurance demand, Enjolras and Sentis (2008) find it to be negative. Additionally, Mishra 
and Goodwin (2003) and van Asseldonk et al. (2002) report no significant effect of the 
farmer's age on crop insurance demand.  
Furthermore, considering Arrow’s hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA) (1971), wealthier farmers, who can be identified in our data by the farm size, are less 
risk averse and therefore less likely to purchase crop insurance. However, the authors who 
estimate a significant impact of farm size on insurance demand (Coble et al., 1996; Enjolras 
and Sentis, 2008), find it to be positive. Additionally, in the context of a transition economy, 
provision of financial services to large farms might be associated with lower transaction costs 
per unit of the insured acreage than for their smaller counterparts. Accordingly, potentially 
the use of crop insurance can be higher for larger farms in Hungary.  
Farm indebtedness can also be used as an indicator of the farmer's risk attitude. On one 
hand, farmers with a higher level of the leverage might be regarded as less risk averse, since 
they are ready to accept a higher financial risk. In this case, the farmer should be less likely to 
purchase crop insurance.9 On the other hand, burdens of financial obligations might make 
the farmer more risk averse. If the latter is true, a higher level of leverage would lead to a 
higher demand for insurance. Indeed, recent studies reveal a positive impact of this variable 
on the insurance demand (Smith and Baquet, 1996; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; van 
Asseldonk et al., 2002; Mishra and Goodwin, 2003). This empirical finding suggests that in 
developed countries, the second phenomenon prevails, i.e., higher indebted farms face a 
higher farm risk exposure and are therefore more likely to purchase insurance.  
Another variable indicating the farm risk exposure is farm production potential, a factor 
including soil quality and yield of wheat and grain maize. A good and stable farm production 
                                                        
9A high indebtedness could also limit the crop insurance use because of more severe budget 
constraints of indebted farms. 
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potential can be found in regions facing less natural disasters and thus, a lower risk level. 
This variable’s coefficient can therefore be expected to have a negative sign.  
It is difficult to predict the sign of the coefficient for the dummy variable family farm. On 
one hand, family farmers might be more risk averse compared to corporate farms where 
several holders jointly own the farm. On the other hand, budget constraints might be more 
pronounced in the case of family farms.  
The dummy for the 2007-2009 period, when the DMS was available for farmers (period 
2), and the dummy for the year 2009, when the DMS became compulsory for small- and 
medium-sized farms, are both expected to have a negative impact on crop insurance demand, 
since the DMS can be considered as a crop insurance substitute. 
Finally, only Enjolras and Sentis (2008) indicate a significant impact of the economic 
performance indicator on insurance demand. In their analysis, the effect is negative. 
However, since our case study lies in an institutional environment, with farmers evidently 
facing budget constraints, farm financial performance is expected to have a positive impact 
on the crop insurance demand of farms.  
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the two model specifications employed in our study, 
as described in the previous section. The coefficient estimates of the economic performance 
model can be found on the table’s left-hand side, while the estimates presented on the right-
hand side refer to the crop insurance demand model.  
RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MODEL 
The coefficient of the crop insurance use in the economic performance model has a negative 
sign and is significant for both model specifications. Accordingly, farmers who use crop 
insurance show a significantly lower economic performance than non-users. It can be 
concluded that either there is no positive effect of crop insurance on farm performance, or its 
extent is relatively small to compensate for insurance premium cost. This implies that 
farmers who purchase crop insurance are risk averse and willing to accept a lower income to 
reduce their risks.  
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Table 4 
System of equations’ estimation results a, b  
Economic Performance Model  Crop Insurance Demand Model 
 PM TFP   PM TFP 
Insurance use -0.07  **  -0.05  ***   Econ. performance 5.13  **  12.27  **  
Intercept  153.90  ***  23.08  ***   Intercept  -1.67  ***  -0.84  ***  
Farm size  -0.05   * 0.05  ***   Farm size  0.66  ***  -0.19  
Intensity  0.03   0.01   Investment  0.81  ***  0.30  ***  
Investment  -0.03  **  -0.001   Prod. potential. 0.30  -0.38  
Prod. potential  0.12  ***  0.07  ***   DMS payments  0.25  *  0.08  
Diversification  0.01  -0.001   Diversification  -0.30  **  -0.07  
Rented land  -0.03   0.02  ***   Rented land  0.67  ***  0.01  
Age  -0.03  -0.03  ***   Age  0.42  ***  0.33  **  
Education  0.002   0.002   Education  0.16  0.24  ***  
Transdanubia  -0.16  ** -0.02   Indebtedness -0.58  ***  -0.21  ***  
Great Plain  -0.06  0.003   Family farm  -0.72  ***  0.06  
Family farm  0.03  -0.03  ***   Period 2  -0.36  -0.18  
Year  -0.08  ***  -0.01  ***   Year 2009  4.48  ***  2.07  ***  
aThe results are presented according to the two different economic performance measures, profit 
margin (PM) and total factor productivity (TFP).  
bThe reported values are the estimated coefficients of every variable, *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Source: authors’ calculations  
 
From production-related factors, only production potential obtained a significant positive 
effect on the farm profit. The effect of farm size on the profit is found to be negative at the 
0.10 significance level. At the same time, the factor size yields a significantly positive 
coefficient estimate in the TFP specification. This result suggests the presence of economies 
of scale in Hungarian agriculture and is consistent with findings by Gorton and Davidova 
(2004). The opposite signs of the effect of size on two considered farm performance measures 
imply that when determining farm performance by productivity growth, which is a relative 
measure free of price effects, larger farms seem to be more successful than their smaller 
counterparts. However, when the performance is measured in terms of PM, smaller farms 
perform better. This is a very interesting empirical finding which evidently points at some 
differences in the behaviour of large- and small-scale farms in Hungary – while smaller farms 
appear to exhibit profit-maximizing behaviour, their larger counterparts seem to pursue 
revenue maximization. 
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Furthermore, our empirical results do not suggest the presence of economies of scope – 
the factor diversification does not obtain significant coefficient estimates in any specification. 
Neither does the factor investment gain a significant estimate in the TFP specification; 
however, it has a negative sign of the coefficient estimate in the PM specification. Considering 
that in a credit-constrained environment, farms finance their investment to a large part from 
their own profit, the latter result is quite reasonable.    
Farms with higher shares of rented land perform better in terms of TFP. This result 
supports our hypothesis about higher entrepreneurial and managerial capacities in farms 
with higher shares of rented land. However, we are unable to reveal any significant effect of 
the farm manager’s education on farm performance. While the farm manager’s age does not 
significantly influence the farm profit, it has a negative effect on farm productivity. 
Accordingly, younger farmers in Hungary seem to be more keen and successful in their 
efforts to improve the long-term performance of their business, e.g., by investing in more 
productive technologies, than their older counterparts. 
As for the regional dummy variables, our model estimates indicate that, compared to 
Central Hungary (captured by the intercept), Transdanubian farms have a lower PM, but the 
performance of the Great Plain farms does not differ significantly. Our estimation results also 
show that family farms have a significantly lower TFP. However, we are unable to find 
significant differences in the performance of two groups of farms considering PM. Finally, we 
observe a negative trend in both the PM and TFP developments. This finding is in line with 
empirical evidence which might go back to a negative trend in the development of Hungarian 
economy in the second half of the first decade of 2000s.  
 
RESULTS OF THE CROP INSURANCE DEMAND MODEL 
As for the crop insurance demand model, we find a positive effect of both PM and TFP level 
on the crop insurance demand. This result indicates that the economic performance of farms 
significantly influences Hungarian farmers’ demand for crop insurance and points at the 
presence of farm budget constraints in Hungarian agriculture.  
The effect of further factors is quite consistent across the two model specifications. Farm 
investment activity significantly increases the Hungarian farm’s demand for crop insurance 
in both model specifications. This finding is reasonable, as farms with a higher level of 
investment are exposed to a greater degree of uncertainty concerning their future cash flow. 
A similar effect is present for farms with higher shares of rented land.  
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Furthermore, according to the PM specification, larger farms are more likely to purchase 
crop insurance. This result confirms our hypothesis about better access of large farms to 
financial services in the presence of high transaction costs in rural financial markets. This 
finding is also supported by a significantly negative estimate for the family farm dummy 
variable in the PM specification.  
According to our estimation results, the DMS seems to be rather a complement than a 
substitute for crop insurance. This result is quite reasonable because the DMS has provided 
coverage against several hazards for which none has been offered by the Hungarian crop 
insurance system. Our estimates also indicate that lowering risk due to diversification can 
indeed be regarded as an on-farm substitute for crop insurance.  
The significant negative coefficient of indebtedness emphasizes that less indebted farms 
are more likely to purchase crop insurance. This finding is logical, considering that farms 
with lower financial obligations have more free means to purchase crop insurance. Moreover, 
farmers who intentionally avoid borrowing might be more risk averse and thus more willing 
to purchase crop insurance, compared to their counterparts who more easily incur debts. 
Age and education both have a positive impact on crop insurance demand. This suggests 
that better educated and more experienced farmers consider crop insurance as a valuable risk 
management tool.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We postulate a reciprocal causation between farm economic performance and crop insurance 
demand in the context of a transition economy. To test for this potential relationship between 
economic performance and insurance demand, we use the simultaneous equation model as 
formulated by Nelson and Olson (1978), Amemiya (1979) and Maddala (1983). Exploratory 
factor analysis serves to reduce the set of variables to a group of factors which are later used 
as the determinants in the simultaneous equation model. A further empirical procedure 
involves the derivation of a multilateral consistent TFP index proposed by Caves et al. (1982), 
using the estimated technological parameters of a random parameter model (Greene, 2004; 
2005). Together with the farm PM, TFP scores are used as measures of farm economic 
performance in two alternative model specifications.     
Based on this methodology, the study seeks empirical evidence for: (i) the presence of 
financial constraints in Hungarian agriculture, which makes farm economic performance an 
important determinant of farm insurance demand and (ii) the presence of a positive 
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externality, which might be generated by crop insurance in a credit-rationed economic 
environment. In particular, we test whether the use of crop insurance by improving farmers’ 
access to external finance allows the insured farmers to improve their economic performance 
through adoption of more productive technologies.  
Our empirical results confirm our hypothesis of reciprocal causation between farm 
economic performance and insurance demand in the context of Hungarian agriculture. 
According to both model specifications employed, both measures of economic performance 
have a positive and significant impact on farm insurance demand.   
Furthermore, the study’s findings indicate that financial restrictions indeed constrain 
Hungarian farmers’ demand for crop insurance, and are thus in line with Kemény et al.'s 
findings (2011). However, our estimation results suggest a negative impact of crop insurance 
use on the economic performance of Hungarian cropping farms. Even though this result 
contradicts our expectations about the insurance capacity for generating positive 
externalities, it agrees with the EU model, according to which the risk-averse farmer is ready 
to pay a premium to reduce her risk exposure.  
Our model estimates show that further important determinants of the Hungarian farm 
performance are agri-climatic conditions, which we have captured with the factor production 
potential, as well as farm managers’ entrepreneurial abilities leading to expansion of their 
farm’s production possibilities by renting additional land. Moreover, our estimates suggest 
that while large farms in our sample are more productive in terms of scale and technical 
efficiency, their smaller counterparts seem to perform better regarding allocative efficiency. 
This situation might be related to a lower extent of agency problems and a more effective 
incentive structure within small entities.   
The main determinants of the Hungarian farm crop insurance demand are farm 
investment and farm size. Indeed, our results suggest that larger and corporate farms seem to 
have better access to crop insurance. This finding again implies some imperfections in the 
Hungarian rural financial market, when financial institutions seek to reduce their transaction 
costs by offering their services to relatively large entities only. Finally, we could reveal 
different preferences of Hungarian farms regarding risk management strategies: farms 
involved in diversification – an on-farm management strategy – exhibit a significantly lower 
demand for crop insurance, whereas farm participation in the damage mitigation system – a 
risk-sharing strategy – increases farm demand for crop insurance. This finding can be 
explained either by varying perceptions and experiences of farmers with financial risk 
management instruments or by the nature and extent of their risk exposure.  Indeed, certain 
risks can only be partially managed on the farm and have to be shared in a pool with others.  
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The long-term effect of crop insurance on farm performance is particularly relevant to the 
decision about governmental subsidization of agricultural insurance. Our study presents an 
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of an agricultural insurance system in the context of a 
transition economy. Although we were unable to find any significant positive effect of crop 
insurance on farm performance in the Hungarian agriculture context, the methodology 
applied in our study can be used to evaluate insurance programmes in other transition or 
developing countries. Moreover, given the farm budget constraints, studies into crop 
insurance demand determinants might produce biased results if not controlling for the 
potential reciprocal causation between farm economic performance and insurance use.  
Although this study employs a dataset for a quite representative period of six years, data 
for a longer period would be required to obtain more robust results and to study interactions 
among farm performance, investment and demand for crop insurance by employing a 
dynamic model specification. Moreover, future research should involve an analysis of the 
crop insurance effect on variance and higher moments of the farm income distribution.    
Considering Hungary’s case, the government has to initiate major efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of crop insurance products. The New Risk Management Act launched in 2012 is 
definitely a right step in this direction, with its aims to improve insurance effectiveness and 
address both farm budget constraints and the lack of trust issue. The design and 
implementation of insurance products that are better tailored to the farmers’ needs and 
temporary governmental insurance premium subsidies to encourage insurance use may 
restore trust in the insurance system. An adequate time horizon for governmental 
subsidization should be chosen so that positive externalities of insurance use can become 
evident for farmers. The evaluation of this new system may generate important insights for 
further improvement of insurance products in other economies. 
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